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The proposed Free Trade agreement
between Panama and the United States has
been the subject of ongoing negotiations for the
past two-and-one-half years. At the time that
this article was being written, nine rounds of
talks had been held, and a tenth would eventu-
ally be necessary to reach a final agreement.
While many of the issues have been settled, a
few continue to hold up negotiations. Clearly
the representatives of both nations wish to
secure the most advantageous agreement 
possible for their respective economies. 
In this article I argue that Panama’s 
success hinges on the government’s imple-
mentation of agricultural support and transi-
tion programs for rural producers whose goods
are susceptible to competition from imported
American products. While other trade-related
issues may be important to Panama’s economy,
it is the agricultural question that is most 
likely to cause resistance and domestic prob-
lems for the Panamanian government. 
Proponents of free trade argue that 
liberalization results in various benefits for
everyone involved, whether consumers or pro-
ducers, or whether from developing or devel-
oped nations. These benefits include a lower
cost of living as well as higher national and per-
sonal incomes. While some opponents of free
trade argue that competition from cheaper
imports may result in loss of income and unem-
ployment for certain inefficient domestic pro-
ducers, supporters maintain that the added 
available markets for competitive sectors will
generate extra revenue that can be used for
helping inefficient sectors adapt to competition
or transition to a new activity altogether. (“Ten
Benefits of the WTO Trading System”)
I begin by providing some background
information on the trading relationship
between Panama and the United States. I then
examine two comparable free trade agreements
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(FTAs) that the United States has signed in
recent history: the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central American
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).1 After dis-
cussing the lessons that can be learned from
these past free trade agreements, I attempt to
apply these lessons to Panama’s FTA with the
United States. Finally, based on these applica-
tions and my own analysis, I articulate a way for
the Panamanian government to ensure that this
FTA helps to promote development and stabil-
ity for the Panamanian people. I also look to see
whether Panama is currently taking the appro-
priate steps to ensure a smooth post-FTA 
transition process.
U.S.-Panama Trade Relationship
According to the Office of the United States
Trade Representative, the United States and
Panama have enjoyed “long-standing, strong
economic ties.” (Office of the United States
Trade Representative) The United States is by far
Panama’s largest trading partner. In 2005 the
United States accounted for 43.5 percent of
Panamanian exports and 27.2 percent of its
imports. (Hornbeck, 2006) This trade relation-
ship has enjoyed substantial growth in recent
years. Between 2002 and 2003, U.S. exports to
Panama grew by 30 percent. The relationship is
also one of broad access, as in 2002 over 90 per-
cent of Panamanian exports to the United States
came in duty-free. Clearly, although Panama is
one of the United States’ smaller trading part-
ners, Panama’s relationship with the United
States is one of crucial importance. 
What then has forced these negotiations
to an unusual ten rounds, spanning nearly
three years? By all accounts, it seems that agri-
culture has been the major issue blocking 
passage of the agreement. In early 2006,
Panama’s agricultural unions and associations
took to the streets of Panama City to protest
their government’s negotiations with the
United States. (“Panama Protests Build over
FTA”) As I will examine in the next section, agri-
culture is a vital industry to much of the
Panamanian population. Therefore, there is sig-
nificant concern that if American agricultural
goods to which Panamanian producers are par-
ticularly vulnerable, such as pork, poultry and
rice, were allowed immediate access to
Panamanian markets, then the livelihood of
these agricultural producers would be threat-
ened. It is not merely Panamanian officials who
harbor fears of a massive rural displacement as
a result of free market trade with the United
States. Many Panamanian farmers who already
live in poverty have also expressed concern over
the negative effects that an FTA might have on
their source of living.
Panamanian Agriculture Issues
Panama’s agriculture industry is decep-
tively important to Panama as a whole. While
agriculture only makes up 6 percent of total
GDP, it accounts for 17 percent of nationwide
employment. This can be explained by the fact
that many agricultural producers are among
the 40 percent of Panamanians who live in
poverty. Agriculture supports 40 percent of
Panama’s rural population, leading to fears of
rural displacement should Panama open its
markets to American goods too quickly. For
these reasons, Panama has been pushing for a
phased reduction of tariffs on American agri-
cultural goods. Panama also wants a transition
period to develop other exports which it sees as
the most promising sectors for future trade
with the United States. Some of these goods
include melons, palm oil, and pineapples.
(Hornbeck, 2006, p. 13) 
Past Free Trade Agreements
NAFTA
In the case of NAFTA, the most useful
negotiation issue available is that of the
Mexican agricultural industry. In 1995 agricul-
ture made up 5.7 percent of Mexico’s economy
(Poverty in Mexico — Fact Sheet), and most
Mexican farmers lived in poverty, making them
similar to Panamanian farmers. Given that
nearly twelve years have passed since the imple-
mentation of NAFTA, we can analyze the effects
of the agreement on the Mexican agricultural
community.
1Although the Dominican Republic was included as part
of this FTA, leading to the formal title of DR-CAFTA, for the
sake of this article I will be examining solely the Central
American participants. DR-CAFTA will thus be referred to
as CAFTA.
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Just as Panama has certain agricultural
products that are sensitive to trade, Mexico
faced similar problems with maize, dry beans,
grain, and malt barley. It was known that
Mexican production of these foods was ineffi-
cient; and if Mexican producers were subjected
to American competition, the Mexican indus-
tries would likely suffer. (Yunez-Naude) As a
compromise, NAFTA became the first free-trade
agreement to use tariff-rate quotas (TRQ). A tar-
iff-rate quota is a two-tier tariff system that
allows for lower tariffs until a certain level of
imports is reached, at which level the tariff 
significantly increases, making it very difficult
for any imports beyond the TRQ level to achieve
market access. Under the agreement, no tariffs
were levied on imports that were within yearly
quotas. With the TRQ system, tariffs for over-
quota imports in sensitive areas were to be
slowly phased out over a certain period of time.
For maize and dry beans, a phase-out period of
fifteen years was established; for grain and malt
barley, nine years. (Yunez-Naude)
Observers predicted certain effects at the
time of NAFTA’s implementation. First, an over-
all increase in both agricultural imports and
exports was expected. As market access expand-
ed, it made sense that the flow of trade would
do likewise. Many also anticipated that the
product mix would change, reflecting the com-
parative advantage of certain crops and the
comparative disadvantage of others. There was
also fear that some rural displacement could
result from the entrance of certain American
goods into the Mexican market, potentially 
forcing the least efficient of Mexican farmers to
give up production. 
As expected, prices of products for which
Mexican producers were less competitive did
drop overall. Real domestic prices within
Mexico for such agricultural goods dropped by
an average of 25 percent from 1993–2000.
However, after seven years of NAFTA, statistics
showed that only for soybeans and wheat did
domestic production drop and imports rise. For
barley, beans, and maize, imports did in fact
increase, but there was no accompanying drop
in domestic production. Analysis has shown
that yields per hectare (Ha) of these various
grains under irrigated conditions did in fact
increase in efficiency, going from an average of
3.61 metric tons per Ha during 1983–1990, to
4.6 metric tons per Ha during the post-NAFTA
period. (Yunez-Naude, p. 19) Because one can
generally assume that irrigated conditions indi-
cate commercial production, these statistics
have led some Mexican experts to the conclu-
sion that “trade liberalization of importables
have promoted a more efficient land use by
commercial farmers.” (Yunez-Naude, p. 20)
It is important to note that no accompa-
nying increase in efficiency appeared in rain-
fed (non-irrigated) lands that produced Mexican
importable goods. This would create an expec-
tation that those producers operating rain-fed
lands would be forced to shut down, unable to
compete with commercially produced and
imported competition. This in turn would 
create rural dislocation. However, this disloca-
tion did not occur. 
A possible explanation for the survival of
rain-fed farms is that these producers are main-
ly small farmers producing food for their own
families’ consumption. Were this the case, even
with an influx of cheaper imports it is unlikely
that a farmer would change his entire crop. This
possibility is particularly convincing given the
Mexican Agricultural Census of 1990, in which
more than 55 percent of agricultural units
under 5 Ha of arable land produced food for self-
consumption. (“Mexican Agricultural Census
1991…”) This would explain the lack of rural
displacement and have significant implications
for Panama’s case. If a substantial portion of
Panama’s rural poor produce vulnerable agri-
cultural products for their own consumption,
then the fear of detrimental effects resulting
from American penetration of Panama’s mar-
kets would be largely reduced. 
Similarly, a 2003 World Bank report 
concludes that “NAFTA has not had a devastat-
ing effect on Mexico’s agriculture. In fact, both
domestic production and trade in agricultural
goods rose during the NAFTA years.” (Lederman,
Maloney and Serven) The study offers three pos-
sible arguments for why the predicted negative
effects did not occur. First, it points out that
aggregate demand for agricultural products
grew in Mexico and the United States in the 
late 1990s. In addition, the study mentions 
the increase in productivity in Mexican irrigat-
ed land, and it suggests that the Mexican 
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government made more efficient use of its agri-
cultural subsidies and income supports.
Furthermore, an analysis carried out by the U.S.
International Trade Commission concluded that
“many of the concerns expressed prior to NAFTA
about agricultural unemployment and environ-
mental degradation never materialized.” (“The
Impact of Trade Agreements...”)
A 2004 report from the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace points out
that the net effect of NAFTA has, in many sens-
es, been neutral. (Polaski) The agricultural 
sector did suffer losses, as total Mexican agri-
cultural employment went from just over 8 
million in 1993 to fewer than 7 million in 2002.2
However, total net job growth in export manu-
facturing jobs over the same period of time
equaled approximately 1 million jobs, largely
offsetting the job losses in agriculture. As the
report states, “The substitution of manufactur-
ing jobs for agricultural jobs is generally posi-
tive for development, representing a move up
the production ladder.” (Polaski)
The Peso Crisis of 1994–1995 created a
complicated situation for economists, who have
had difficulty untangling the effects of the 
crisis when attempting to accurately gauge the
effects of NAFTA on Mexico’s economy as a
whole. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that
there have been both positive and negative
effects on Mexico. While the agricultural indus-
try did experience negative growth, it seems
that the growth in Mexico’s more competitive
sectors, such as manufacturing, has offset the
losses experienced by farming. Additionally, it
is possible that the Mexican government failed
to provide adequate unemployment insurance
and transition assistance to its agricultural 
producers, thus making the task of adjustment
to newly liberalized markets much more diffi-
cult for the average farmer. (Polaski, p. 12)
CAFTA
The Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) was signed into law by
President Bush on August 2, 2005. Over the
course of nine rounds of negotiation between
the United States and its Central American
counterparts, many of the same issues arose
that we now face in U.S.-Panama negotiations.
The Central American participants in CAFTA
are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua. A primary concern
among all Central American actors was the pre-
dicted effect that the removal of quotas on
American imports of agricultural staple prod-
ucts would have on the rural poor populations
of these countries. Fearing that the influx of
cheaper American goods would drive the prices
of such products down, there was a prediction
that the rural producers of noncompetitive
goods would be unable to sufficiently protect
their livelihoods. This led many to forecast 
possible rural displacement and migration. The
Central American nations were, nevertheless,
able to reach a compromise with the United
States, establishing similar agricultural TRQ
rates to those that were agreed upon between
Mexico and the U.S. under NAFTA. 
Currently there are very few studies
assessing the impact of the agreement on the
Central American countries as a whole, let
alone on their rural poor populations. However,
it is possible to take advantage of the scholarly
analysis and literature that exists concerning
Central American agricultural policy in the 
context of free trade agreements.3 Such litera-
ture does not exist with specific reference to
Panama, but by using CAFTA information it is
possible to become familiar with the dilemmas
that the Panamanian government faces and to
suggest some strategies that should lead to agri-
cultural development. When discussing
“Central American nations,” it is important to
remember that Panama is included in this 
category. 
It is clear that the Central American
nations have a comparative advantage in terms
of labor when compared to the United States.
(Hornbeck, 2005) Therefore, one would expect
that trade liberalization will result in increased
production of labor-intensive agricultural 
2Note that these figures reflect only official statistics;
notably, a significant number of Mexican farmers in rural
areas of the country are not included in government reports.
3The most important works include Winters, McCulloch,
and McKay, as well as “DR-CAFTA: Challenges and
Opportunities for Central America,” in addition to Todd,
Winters, and Arias. 
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products. In order for this advantage to be fully
realized, Panama (and other Central American
nations) must work towards several conditions.
First, according to a 2006 World Bank
report entitled “DR-CAFTA: Challenges and
Opportunities for Central America,” public infra-
structure needs to be improved in order for
Central American rural farmers to take advan-
tage of international market access. According
to the Inter-American Development Bank, many
poor rural areas in Central America lack the
transportation and communication infrastruc-
ture to participate in international trade. (Todd,
Winters and Arias, p. 29) This means that even
if poor farmers with competitive goods were
granted increased access to international mar-
kets, many of them would either not be aware
of this newfound possibility or would be unable
to efficiently ship their goods to a city where
they could take advantage of international trade.
If infrastructure can be improved, then those
farmers who produce exportable products can
make use of free markets, thereby increasing
trade and profits. 
Secondly, the World Bank recommends
that Central American governments need to
invest in transition assistance aimed at poor
rural producers of goods whose prices will
decrease as a result of foreign competition. This
transition assistance should be aimed at 
providing income support and technical assis-
tance so that farmers will be able to change what
they produce to adapt to new market 
conditions. (“DR-CAFTA: Challenges...”) In the
years following the implementation of NAFTA,
despite Mexican income assistance to noncom-
petitive farmers, many smaller producers were
unable to transition themselves to produce
goods that were more competitive, due to a lack
of capital and technical ability.
Additionally, the fact that so many Central
American agricultural producers operate on a
small scale (Todd, Winters and Arias, p. 45) has
implications for a transition to the internation-
al market. There is a considerable difference
between selling products to a local market and
being involved in exports to the United States.
For example, Central American governments
will need to provide additional assistance to their
agricultural producers to enable them to meet
American sanitary and inspection standards. It
is likely that very few of these standards apply to
local transactions in rural areas. 
The literature has provided a clear idea of
how to achieve agricultural success in free trade.
Improvement of infrastructure, transition assis-
tance, and general government support all 
play a substantial role for CAFTA participants;
but more importantly they are crucial to
Panama’s experience. I will now examine how




According to the Panamanian Ministry of
Finance and Economics, the Panamanian 
government has been increasing its agricultur-
al spending from 2005–2007. Panama commit-
ted slightly less than $83 million to agricultur-
al investment in 2006, an increase of nearly $15
million from 2005. (“Documento Descriptivo del
Presupuesto...”) Panama’s 2006 agricultural
spending totals 8.2 percent of the federal 
budget, a significant portion for an industry
whose revenue equals only 6 percent of GDP.
Panama’s agricultural funds include money
from the Panamanian Bank of Agricultural
Development, the Panamanian Ministry of
Agricultural Development, the Panamanian
Institute of Agricultural Security, and external
sources such as the Inter-AmericanDevelopment
Bank and the United States. This funding is for
projects designed to improve infrastructure,
technology, competitiveness, and productivity. 
A brief look at some of the projects that the
Panamanian government has funded and car-
ried out will provide a better idea as to whether
Panama can handle the stresses that often
accompany an FTA. The parts of the country
most in need of attention and assistance, i.e., the
regions with the highest poverty rates, are not
coincidentally also the most rural regions in
Panama. These include the regions of San Blas,
Darien, Bocas del Toro, Cocle, and Chiriqui.
(Panama Poverty Assessment...) These are 
the regions that contain many of the farmers
and agricultural workers that have been 
discussed throughout this article. 
There is a government project run by 
the Panamanian Ministry for Agricultural
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Development entitled “Commercialization of
Agricultural Products in Boquete,” the function
of which is to help farmers in Chiriqui become
more competitive. (“Comercializacion de
Productos Agricolas en Boquete”) This project
will include the construction of an inspection
center designed to streamline the crop inspec-
tion and sanitation process, a requirement that
precedes the export of any Panamanian agri-
cultural goods. The Panamanian government
will also establish an office in Panama City
devoted solely to the development and compet-
itiveness of Chiriqui agricultural exports. This
office will reportedly oversee the construction
of proper infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.)
that will allow the workers of Chiriqui to be bet-
ter connected both to Panama City and to the
international market. The entire cost of the 
project will be $1.3 million. 
A similar project was administered in 2005
and 2006 which was dedicated to the repair of
dilapidated roadways connecting extremely
underdeveloped rural areas to Panama’s urban
areas. At a cost of $5.5 million, the Panamanian
government repaired approximately 550 km
(341 miles) of rural roadways, including 75 km
each in the regions of Cocle and Chiriqui. In
addition to these two regions, roads were
repaired in Bocas del Toro, Colón, Darien,
Herrera, Los Santos, Panama Este, Panama
Oeste, and Veraguas. Most of these regions rank
among Panama’s poorest, and the attention to
roads is badly needed. As previously mentioned,
proper infrastructure will allow Panamanian
farmers to better take advantage of their newly
expanded market in the United States. 
Yet another project is focused on the
improvement of the onion industry in the Cocle
region. In April, May, and June of 2005, poor
weather caused the yearly production of onion
crops, one of the most important products for
farmers in Cocle, to drop by 50 percent. (“Planta
Procesadora...”) This project therefore allows
for the construction of a plant which will serve
as a place where farmers can dry, cure, and then
store their onions, thereby reducing their
weather-related losses. Factory personnel will
be trained in the technology necessary to max-
imize crop productivity, a luxury that very few
of the native farmers in the Cocle region have.
This will allow the farmers of Cocle to better
compete with imported onions, some of which
will soon be American.
As was previously noted, in the case of
NAFTA there was a significant difference in the
impact of the FTA between those Mexican agri-
cultural producers that used irrigation systems
and those that did not. It seemed that on the
whole, those farmers who used irrigation were
more efficient and therefore more competitive
in a free-market environment. With this in mind,
it is significant that the Panamanian government
undertook a project in 2006 designed to provide
irrigation water management systems to the
poorest farmers in the regions of Chiriqui, Bocas
del Toro, Colón, and Veraguas. These particular
areas suffer not only from extreme poverty, but
also from irregular patterns of rainfall, making
it difficult for farmers to establish a consistent
pattern of productivity. Irrigation will make it
possible for the farmers to have access to water
even in times of low rainfall. 
In addition to these individual projects,
Panama recently released its federal budget for
2007. It is highly encouraging to see that spend-
ing on agricultural development has vastly
increased. While total Panamanian agricultural
development spending in 2006 was just under
$83 million, this year’s funding from the Bank
of Agricultural Development and the Ministry of
Agricultural Development totals $137 million.
In fact, 2007 spending by the Bank of
Agricultural Development alone will equal 
$73 million, an increase of $30 million from 
the year before. Clearly the Panamanian 
government recognizes that agricultural 
competitiveness is crucial if Panama is to solve
the problem of extreme rural poverty, particu-
larly in the face of increasingly open markets. 
The Panamanian Ministry of Agricultural
Development currently has 44 projects pending
for 2007, the vast majority of which are dedicat-
ed to the improvement of infrastructure and
competitiveness. These include the construction
of a new sanitary inspection site in Cocle, fund-
ing for crop disease prevention in Colón, and
nationwide assistance for the development of
crops that are competitive for exportation.
(“Sistema Nacional de Inversiones Publicas”)
These programs all target the appropriate areas
in order for Panama to successfully deal with
market liberalization.
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The impact of all these projects and dollar
figures is of course contingent on the efficien-
cy and effectiveness of the Panamanian 
government. Whether or not the government
is up to the task remains to be seen, but it can
at least be said that it has taken well-targeted
steps to address the problem by providing 
substantial funds and directing the projects
toward the most obvious problems. 
The Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) is also playing a major role in assisting
Panama with its transition to a more liberal
economy. The IDB recently committed to a 
project for Panama geared towards the
improvement of trade competitiveness. This
will provide $100 million from the IDB, a sum
that should be enough to make a strong impact,
given that Panama’s agricultural labor force is
only around 278,000. The IDB’s Panamanian
country strategy describes several explicit steps
through which the IDB plans to attack rural
poverty in Panama. These steps include an
expansion of electrical power service in rural
areas, the improvement of nation-wide road
infrastructure, an increase in telecommunica-
tions coverage throughout the countryside, and
an improvement in drinking water and sanita-
tion services for the poorest areas of the coun-
try. (“Inter-American Development Bank:
Country Strategy with Panama”)
In addition, the United States Agency for
International Aid (USAID) has committed
another $32.2 million to assist Panama with
economic liberalization and trade transition for
the years 2004–2008. Much of this aid is intend-
ed for the purpose of assisting vulnerable
Panamanian agricultural producers in their
transition to more competitive sectors after the
Free Trade Agreement with Panama and the
United States has been signed. (“Regional
Strategy for Central America and Mexico”)
Although the USAID Panamanian country strat-
egy is rather vague on a number of issues, it
does provide some specifics. For example,
USAID plans to implement a program that
increases awareness among Panamanians of
how exactly an FTA would affect the
Panamanian people. To measure success in this
area, USAID will measure Panamanian under-
standing of the U.S.-Panama FTA through a 
succession of public surveys. An improved
understanding of the FTA’s impacts will lead to
a quicker transition by the Panamanian people
to newly advantageous sectors.
It is important to consider that the phase-
out of TRQs for the most sensitive agricultural
goods will most likely take place over 15 to 20
years. It is generally accepted that the structure
of the TRQs will be similar to those agreed upon
for CAFTA, as will many other sections of 
the agreement, including environmental and
labor rights. (Hornbeck, 2006, p. 16) This will 
provide ample time for Panama’s producers of
sensitive goods to either make an effective tran-
sition to producing more competitive products
or to improve their productivity within their
existing industry. This is especially true given
the amount of assistance that is being provid-
ed both by the Panamanian government and
external sources such as the IDB.
Conclusion
It is clear that the Panamanian government
has taken into consideration the importance and
value of proper support and assistance for its
rural agricultural producers. Success will be
partly measured by the stated goals of the
Panamanian government. If the government is
seeking simply to avoid rural displacement, then
simple income assistance will probably be
enough to make sure such displacement does
not happen. If the goal of the government is to
significantly increase the average income of rural
agricultural producers and to help pull them out
of poverty, then more significant investments
will be required in areas such as technological
assistance and infrastructure. Either way, there
does not seem to be a justification for the fear of
mass unemployment and rural displacement as
a result of the Panama/United States Free Trade
Agreement. Panama’s government must do a
better job of communicating with its citizens
concerning government-run programs that will
provide infrastructure and technical assistance
to poor farmers. If rural producers can be 
convinced that their livelihoods will not be in
jeopardy, then Panama should be able to come
to an agreement with the United States and
enjoy successful economic liberalization.
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